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The Place of
Professional Education in the
Life of the University
Edward H. Levi
The subject we are called upon to discuss is onefrequently set for ceremonial occasions. We
tend to romanticize the ideal of an undergraduate
and graduate education-kept non-professional. A
conflict is seen as arising when professional educa­
tion moves into this haven. So far as our law schools
are concerned, the history evoked is the overtaking
of apprenticeship training by the schools, and then
the movement of the schools into the universities.
We think of the same thing as having happened in
a much bigger way with medicine. We note also
the emergence of newer professions which already
have created schools within the universities, or are
about to do so. The history, looked at from this
narrow point of view, suggests that there is a ques­
tion as to whether any particular profession should
receive its formal professional training within a uni­
versity. It reminds us, in any event, that successful
training can' take place outside the general aca­
demic halls. At the present time, the older profes­
sional schools see themselves as important, though
separate, parts of the university. They naturally
wish to maintain their own strength, and to a con­
siderable extent their separateness. Since the topic
is ceremonial, the conflict is seen as resolved by a
proper appreciation of what each part of the uni­
versity contributes to a whole, and an expectation
of further, usually broadening, relationships. Fre-
This article by Edward H. Leoi, President of The
University of Chicago, is reprinted with the per­
mission of the Ohio State Law Journal (Vol. 32,
No.3, 1971).
quently, not much is said about that part of the pro­
fession which continues outside the university; not
much is said either about the kind of minimum
commitment which is necessary before any part of
a university, including a professional school, can
contribute to the whole.
But the topic is' a serious one, and particularly
when new responsibilities are placed upon universi­
ties and upon the professions, and when the results
of our present structure and arrangements are suffi­
ciently disconcerting to suggest major alterations.
It is not just a matter of historical peculiarity to
note that, if one traces the modern university to the
medieval university, then professional education is
central. The notion that professional education has
somehow forced its way into university education is
a kind of Americanism. But as a matter of history,
if we trace the modern university to the medieval
university, then the point should be made that pro­
fessional education was the reason for that univer­
sity. In the medieval university, work was directed
toward the professions of theology, law, and medi­
cine. Among the oldest universities there are those
which began as law schools and then built around
the study of law to become more general academies.
The university itself was a kind of guild collectivity,
sharing some of the same characteristics of other
more clearly vocational guilds. If one thinks of the
liberal arts emphasis of the medieval university as
the recapturing of an older tradition, this, too, has a
professional emphasis in its desire to inculcate the
skills required for a citizen. This suggests the im­
portance to higher education of a primary concern
3
4 for the kind of doing and understanding believed to
be helpful to the individual who is going to handle
important problems for individuals and for the so­
ciety. It is an intellectual tradition, but it involves
skills and training for doing. If there is relevance
in this history, and I believe there is, it is no com­
pelling argument against the inclusion of subject
matter within a university to say that the approach
is professional. There are aspects of a truly profes­
sional approach which have been, and continue to
be, basic to proper university work. There is a sense
in which the best university education, and the
only real university education, is professional. One
has to remember that the liberal arts themselves
were training for the profession of a public citizen.
Whatever the history, the modern universityfaces a difficult set of problems which require
decisions as to what should be included within its
responsibilities. The land grant impetus helped cre­
ate a new kind of institution with enormous service
obligations. At the same time, the land grant moneys
enhanced liberal arts training. The land grant help
furthered the idea of the applied wonders of the
enlightenment. The modern state university is in
this tradition. It is a marvelous facility. All kinds
of duties have been placed upon it because it is
such a useful agency. But it is hard to know what
its proper boundaries ought to be. Moreover, the
liberal arts concept itself, never fully controlling for
a university in any event, has become a weakened
guide. Changes in the structure of life, in training
for vocations, and the rejection of class distinctions
never accepted as ideal in the United States (distinc­
tions which no doubt helped to support the idea of
what the liberal arts might be, or what was properly
professional and not vocational) have made it more
difficult to determine which skills ought to be taught
at the university level. Decisions of this kind become
more important and immediate once it is decided a
general education at the college level ought to be
available to every citizen. There is a strong tempta­
tion to believe it makes no difference. Tastes and
needs differ; there is to be education for all anyway;
perhaps the institution should offer something for
everyone. That kind of happy evasion of responsi-
sibility cannot hold for long. There are important
overall problems of the allocation of educational re­
sources within the society, and among the levels of
education. Within individual institutions there are
questions which relate to their own integrity. The
questions are: What can an institution do well, and
what is the effect of the doing on the quality of
other activities of the enterprise? Universities do
not perform well in some areas. Their performance
may be no better, and indeed be worse, than that of
other possible institutions. This is true in many of
the applied or practical areas. There are striking
differences among diverse fields, as indeed among
universities. For example, many areas are not served
by a profession. There is no one profession-some
would say there isn't any at all-despite the lawyers,
the political scientists, the sociologists, the psychol­
ogists, the economists-which represents the social
sciences. Many items which become the focus for
pressures of the moment, such as remedies for pol­
lution of the environment, find no ready profession
to test and carry out solutions in the practical
sphere. Where there is no profession, it is particu­
larly difficult for the university to carry out a pro­
gram involving all kinds of facets of life, even
though the need to do so may seem great. And
where there is a profession, one has the opportunity
and the necessity to determine the best division of
responsibility between the university and the pro­
fession. Universities do run medical clinics, but it
does not seem likely they should run the court sys­
tem, and it is at least questionable how much of the
delivery of health care should be centered in edu­
cational institutions, if the desire is to have the best
health care, or the best educational institutions.
Universities have to be concerned about the effect
of one function upon another. Unless the university
is merely a geographical place-and perhaps even
if that is all it is-it must be realized that the in­
clusion of skills and subjects has an effect on other
skills and subjects. It is both a shallow and incorrect
answer to say this variety is justified because it mir­
rors life. New skills and subject matter result not
only in different approaches which may be seriously
incompatible, but also in the inclusion of faculty
who will influence not only their own area but have
an influence throughout the institution. We like to
believe this is good, but in fact it is good only under
some circumstances. The question need not be what
is important or not, nor a judgment as to what areas
can have quality of their own, but rather what is
sufficiently related to the ways of thought and to the
particular and appropriate standards of excellence
for the entire institution, so that inclusion is mutu­
ally helpful. Admittedly there are ways around this
view of the total institution. An institution can be
so divided that it is really one institution in name
only. It may find then that its salvation is in separa­
tion. But even if this, in a given case, is the best
possible, the implications on accountability, institu­
tional integrity, and the university ideal are dis­
turbing.
As one thinks of professional education, therefore,
one must see a relationship in one direction to a pro­
fession, and in the other direction to the life of the
university. Professional education which has no par­
ticular need for the disciplined process of criticism
and discussion, closely related to a shared body of
knowledge, gains less and contributes less to the
university. This is a matter of degree and empha­
sis-the impact of inclusion to increase either the
centrifugal or centripetal forces within the institu­
tion, and thus to reduce or increase shared values.
The sporadic attempts to sustain the theater and
the arts generally, by placing them under the uni­
versity mantle, raise this kind of problem in an ap­
pealing way. There are no automatic answers. But,
if the interrelationship is to have qualitative advan­
tages both to the institution as a whole and to the
separate discipline, there are concerns which can be
stated. For example, there is the right to insist, from
a university point of view, that professional educa­
tion seriously examine the problems with which the
professions deal, in part, but only in part, because a
never-ending attempt to determine what is crucial
is implicit in university education. Thus, the train­
ing cannot be regarded as set solely by the way the
professions now operate. It is a criticism of social
service schools if they have not been concerned with
the theory of the approach to poverty and social wel­
fare, but instead have been totally involved in the
training of practitioners. It is a criticism of law
schools if matters of public policy are totally sub­
merged in the analysis of appellate opinions, or are
skewed by absorption into the concerns of constitu­
tionalism without recognition of the broader domain
of how law operates. A statement such as this last
one is often taken as an emphasis on law in action,
as in a way it is, but also as a plea for the revelance
to law training of the kind of social science research
which goes on outside law schools. But that kind
of research, while it always may be important for
law, to the extent that the research itself is opinion­
making and thus value-forming for the society, is
not necessarily germane to direct the insights and
judgments which should illuminate the professional
study of law.
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In any event, law schools might have done betterin recent years in the United States if they had
given greater attention to legal history and juris­
prudence as a way of looking at problems which
are around us, and which tend to evoke the coer­
cive power of law. I mention these subjects, perhaps
as symbols, to stress the importance to a discipline
of the conscious attempt to draw upon and reformu­
late concepts and distinctions-which the study of
law in the United States certainly does-and also to
emphasize the importance of the continuing en­
deavor to make these concepts and distinctions bas­
ic, transcending the compartmentalization within
the subject, while at the same time relating the ap­
proaches of the moment to recorded experience.
The point, then, is that not only must the problems
with which the profession deals be seen free from
the confining structures of prevailing practice, but
also there must be, to justify university professional
training, the reality of an intellectual discipline
which can draw upon itself, has the ability to build
upon and modify ideas, and is capable of providing
learning and insight. Not everything which calls it­
self a profession has an intellectual discipline to
draw upon, and even if it does have this history and
structure, ways of preparing for a profession may be
adopted which belittle and fail to draw upon that
intellectual discipline. And if this happens within a
university, the disservice has consequences not only
for that segment, but for the institution as a whole.
When the professions through professional educa­
tion come to the university, the terms upon which
they come should include a commitment to the in­
tellectual process and the pursuit of truth. There are
6 special reasons for this. The intellectual process is
the central means of communication within the uni­
versity. It is the chief means for the university's
contribution to the society. It is, indeed, the univer­
sity's way of exploring the role of the non-rational
experience, the place and meaning of the funda­
mental presuppositions which ultimately provide
the basis for institutions and values, and for attempt­
ing to understand the relationships between the
known and the unknown. One does not have to
argue that the non-rational is an important part of
life. There is nothing strange or unexpected in the
continuation or reappearance of various movements
which find exaltation or fulfillment in ways other
than intellectual discourse or inquiry. Moreover,
no one need contend the intellect exists by itsel£-a
conception which is only a mockery. Nevertheless,
the essence of a university is in the belief in the im­
portance of ideas, the necessity to rethink them, to
create them through understanding and invention,
a willingness to respond to criticism and to the re­
sults of experiments-in short, a truth-finding proc­
ess of a particular kind. There is an analogy here
to the ideal of the objective rule of law and to con­
stitutional protections, which are protections mainly
because they require a sober second thought. The
question is not the emphasis to be given to the mys­
teries or certainties for the good of individuals and
societies, but only the role of the universities. The
odd thing about these days, as Sir Isaiah Berlin has
written, is that general movements of irrationality,
always to be expected, have been joined by the
popularized and distorted slogans taken out of sci­
ence. The combined emphasis is upon the irrational,
the unconscious, and the automaticity of scientific
laws which control all things, including words and
thoughts, and control the process of reasoning.
While all this can be a useful caution and, as it has
been, part of the intellectual process itself, the effect
has been to downgrade the possibility and ideal of
reason, and to disparage the ideal of objective truth.
A strange aspect of this joining of movements is that,
in part, it reflects an interest in but also an attack
upon the social sciences by the natural sciences. The
movements are also marked by hostility to those
areas of the social sciences which have more struc­
tures and, therefore, more independence of their
own, including economics and law. It is as though
the problems of the natural sciences were to be re­
garded as suitable subjects for inquiry, to be investi­
gated through the rational process, but in the social
sciences, the problems and thoughts about them­
the subjects of inquiry and the process of inquiry­
were to be viewed as predetermined, where reason
makes no independent contribution. In this context,
ideas are less important than the personality and
style of those who originate them; ideas are viewed
only as good as popular acceptance makes them,
either now or by someone's judgment of what wins
in the future. The influence of the popular is more
marked because of the impact of television and im­
mediate communication, tending to make a one­
dimensional society. These movements highlight.
the vulnerability of the universities. The denigration
of the truth-finding process, which is probably never
intended in its full sweep, gives to the universities
little reason for existence other than as power mech­
anisms. But viewed as power mechanisms, they
have, in fact, little power to defend themselves from
pressures from without, and little basis for standards
of achievement within. This kind of power not only
corrupts the universities; it removes the basis for
the only kind of power which ultimately supports
their influence.
This setting has relevance to the study of law asa professional subject in the universities. The
training of a lawyer is necessarily concerned with
the mastery of the means which produce acquies­
cence or agreement. Then law as a responsive in­
strument within the society continually borrows and
incorporates doctrines, popular as of the moment,
taken from many disciplines, reflecting over-simpli­
fication and distortion. There are many examples of
this in the academic legal literature and in the
opinions of judges. The ability to borrow doctrines
and to use them is an important part of the lawyer's
training; again the emphasis can be more on persua­
sion than on correctness. In times of heightened
social conflict, the temptation is strong not to view
law as an intellectual discipline which can be drawn
upon and is capable of providing insight and learn­
ing, but solely as a reflection of other forces as to
which law and law study have little to add, and to
view the training of a lawyer as basically the train-
ing of agents in participation. Doctrines and legal
institutions are not regarded as providing illumina­
tion of proposed remedies, but solely as devices for
leaping to solutions or impediments to be viewed
with impatience. This impatience is reflected at va­
rious levels within the profession and also in the
schools. Such a view of law does not remove the
necessity for and perhaps the importance of a pro­
fession which represents others, advances causes,
and accomplishes accepted solutions. But it does
raise questions as to the place and subject matter
of law study, not unlike those which might be asked
about schools of speech, within a university. It has
been recently written in description of many law
students: "They do not want to understand them­
selves or others if that means being less emotionally
involved with their clients and their causes. They
cultivate the sense of a deeply felt commitment; it
is something to be lived and not analyzed. Thus in
a sense they resent what has been the guiding prin­
ciple of legal education; learning to take either side
of the argument."l Yet in some form or another,
learning to take both sides of the argument, whether
it arises out of the adversary nature of law or not,
is essential to understanding and knowing. It is not
paradoxical, but it may seem so, that the adversary
nature of law, frequently foolishly criticized as hos­
tile to truth and commitment, has made available to
law study the imprint of the truth-finding process
which most scholars would understand to be essen­
tial if scientific doctrines were not to be accepted
or rejected simply as articles of faith.
The important and desirable characteristic of the
study of law as a university discipline is the neces­
sity to go beyond stated rules to a consideration of
basic values, and to use these values and their rela­
tionships in a continuing critique of the impact of
those social institutions which have the backing or
coercive power of the state upon the lives of indi­
viduals. Traditions among legal systems vary-and
within these traditions there are cycles of stability
and change-but the drive to see more basic prin­
ciples, or the law beyond the law (present both
within the hierarchy of a legal system and outside
of it), reflects a moral purpose and endows the study
of law with a seriousness and centrality which makes
it a liberal arts subject and helps to make law a pro­
fession. A driving force within professional law
study is the effort to come to terms with the rela­
tionship between commitment, disciplined inquiry,
and craftsmanship. If the moral purpose is seriously
held, and the nature of the subject understood,
craftsmanship will be highly valued. Max Weber
characterized the desire of the lawyer to be seen as
dealing with more than set rules as arising, in
part, from an attempt to increase his sense of power.
"The more the impression grows that legal orders as
such are no more than <technical tools,' the more
violently will such degradation be rejected by the
lawyers." This may be true. If so, it is fortunate.
The subject matter, whether in the hands of lawyers,
political scientists, or sociologists, requires more
than a rule book. Even in those terms, one has
to know how to work the rules with a purpose if one
is to understand them. For what is at issue is the
basis of government, the idea of a covenant which
joins people, the concepts of legitimacy, authority
and control of participation, the essential attributes
of fairness, problems of intention and act, the char­
acteristics by which human actions are to be judged;
such as, motive, intent, expectations, and the role of
ambiguity, since it is "a hard thing in great affairs
to satisfy all sides"-in short, the ingredients of a
jurisprudence. The central concern of law for the
distribution and control of powers within the so­
ciety, the impact of these powers upon movements
arid persons, the status of law itself as a responsive
instrument, and the curious isolation and interrela­
tionship which law has to other disciplines, give to
the study of law special opportunities and heavy re­
sponsibilities within the university.
But it is difficult to say, despite the obvious virtues
of legal education in the United States, that this re­
sponsibility is now being carried adequately. The
most important fact about the study of law in the
United States is that the study of law is almost to­
tally absent from the undergraduate curriculum.
The absence is, in large part, due to the growth of
professional education, and the placing of profes­
sional education outside the standard four-year pro­
gram. The development has been helped by the be­
lief that the longest education is the best, and that
those who are serious about a subject will gain mas­
tery of it in the later graduate or professional years.
This pre-emption of mastery over basic subjects re­
lated to human action and choice by the graduate
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8 and professional schools has helped to create, in the
midst of more efforts at education than the world
has ever known, an uneducated society which does
not know where it stands on the basic issues of our
time, and does not know how to approach or think
about these issues. One needs to remind oneself of
the initial thrust and importance of professional
education within a university, with the ingredients
of moral purpose and the seriousness of learning
as mastery for doing. The graduate departments
and professional schools include the major areas of
knowledge. The pre-emption of the subject matter
is, of course, not always complete. Law happens to
be a startling example where a combination of cir­
cumstances has resulted in an almost complete with­
drawal of the subject matter from the undergrad­
uate. The result is that liberal or general education,
always viewed as important for citizenship, avoids
the hard questions and the learning of civilizations
concerning the relationships between the individual
and the state. The importance of a liberal education
for every citizen is greatly diminished when the
basic subjects relating to man in society are either
not taught at all or are taught only as a preliminary
exploration, free from the challenge (which the at­
tempt to gain mastery sets) that the student may
have to act upon what he has learned. In many
areas, and particularly in the humanities and in the
social sciences, the mastery of a discipline at the
undergraduate level has vanished.
Admittedly, this set of problems has great com­
plexity. The undergraduate four-year college be­
lieves it is protected from the encroachment of the
graduate and professional schools by the under­
graduate college's insistence that there be a large
block of time in which the student has the freedom
to think and explore, free from the pressures of mas­
tery or the ability to do. But the results have been
somewhat different from that which was intended.
There is a sense in which education can and should
be endless. It suffers if it is aimless. Undergraduate
education, having no particular structure, other than
the contours of large subject matters within which
there can be, in effect, distribution requirements, is
particularly vulnerable to divisions of subject mat­
ter, reflecting the compartmentalization of depart­
ments and courses at the graduate level and follow­
ing from the organization of faculties into guilds.
Whatever may be said about this organization, it
loses much of its persuasiveness when the student is
not confronted with the problems to be solved, the
craft to be achieved, the purposes to be served. The
undergraduate program is caught in the dilemma
of unfocused general courses, or small units which,
even when sequential, do not have the insistence of
problem-solving or wholeness, unless viewed in
terms of work which will come years later. The
original professional thrust of undergraduate study
helped to organize the work around problems and
mastery. It had the advantage of the purpose of the
professions which helped to organize the disciplines.
It is that kind of organization of work around prob­
lems and responsibility which is needed to give the
undergraduate program its own integrity and free­
dom. This does not require the undergraduate pro­
gram to pretend to a mastery which it cannot give.
Stages of specialization are properly reserved for
graduate work. But we should not be so easily con­
vinced that a considerable amount of mastery is not
possible at the undergraduate level. Law is a good
example. Not only should some law be taught
seriously to every undergraduate, but the fact is
that there is no reason at all why the minimum uni­
versity training of a lawyer cannot be accomplished
through two years of professional training in the
undergraduate years. I note in passing that placing
some of the professional training of the lawyer into
the undergraduate 'years will have an advantage if
it enables the law student to continue the taking of
non-law undergraduate courses in related fields.
Perhaps the greatest argument against this drastic
shortening of years may be the lack of attention
which this may suggest will be given to cultural
history. Yet the present system does not seem to
have effectively provided this dimension.
I have used law as an example of the distortions
which now exist in higher education - a subject
which should be taught in some form to every un­
dergraduate is hardly taught at all at the under­
graduate level, professional training which could be
accomplished in four years now takes seven. There
are other examples. The training of a physician now
occupies so many years as to constitute a national
scandal if the delivery of health care is important.
There is no reason, other than status, that schools of
business or engineering must seek to be completely
graduate. Nor is the frequent separation between
teaching at the undergraduate level and research at
the graduate true to the requirements of good teach­
ing or effective learning. Beyond all this, we should
not accept the professions as given. The professions
themselves suffer not only because they have be­
come vertically fragmented, but there has been a
failure to acknowledge stages of mastery which
could be extremely important, for example, in medi­
cine and law. On these matters, there has been a
defeating interaction between the universities and
the professions. The universities have accepted the
professions as they are, and the professions have
encouraged the universities to continually lengthen
the period of academic training required for all.
The length of time is a serious matter. If there is
to be higher education for all who can qualify, then
the costs of higher education will not only continue
to increase but will be magnified. There is a prob­
lem of the allocation of educational resources among
the various levels of education. And there is also
a cost to the student, not only in monetary terms.
More than that, it is a serious matter for a society to
remove from the doing of the community, and to
shield from the choices which independent citizens
must make, a large segment of the population for
a longer period than is necessary.
In our, present inflexible system, there
is much
room for greater flexibility. We need a period of
experimentation. Many of the pressures of the past
now appear to have been mistaken as, for example,
the pressures against the night law school. We
ought to try to have a period where there will be a
suspension/of the cartelized rules of associations and
accreditation, so that we can see the benefits which
might come from a variety of different forms. The
two-year law school at the professional level, as an
alternative, is surely a possibility. The three-year
school, joined to three years of college, is hardly
adverturesome. The award of a junior degree in
law or a new kind of degree for training in public
service, including law and economics and other
subjects, might help to reorganize undergraduate
education, and if accomplished at the undergrad­
uate level, might carry the opportunity for prepar­
ing the student, even in the face of the likelihood
that specialized training would be later required.
Those who are interested in professional educa­
tion within the university cannot be comforted with
the thought that undergraduate education comes
first and can take care of itself. Much of the organ­
ization of knowledge and the sense of purpose re­
quired for professional education should come at
the undergraduate level. The
-
failure to see profes­
sional education in this setting has harmed the or­
ganization of knowledge, contributed to the delay­
ing years, and reduced the level of public discussion
and understanding. They should not be comforted
either because the organization of the professions
has been such as to force the universities and the
professional schools to undertake more and more
activities, without thought as to what the new func­
tions may be doing to the university, whether the
society is better served thereby, whether the activ­
ities could not be better handled by the professions
themselves. The rigidities within the professions,
the failure of new forms to emerge, to some extent
are a criticism of the universities and of the profes­
sional schools. Those who are interested in pro­
fessional education cannot help but be concerned by
the lengthening of the years required, including
the years at the graduate level. There is some rea­
son to suggest that lawyers who should be interested
in educational forces within the society and the
shape of the society should be most concerned about
this trend. Of course, those who are involved in
professional education can take pride in what has
been developed; that pride must be matched with
concern and inventiveness for the changes which
should come.
9
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The Charlotte - Mecklenburg
Case - Its Significance for
Northern School Desegregation
board is allowed to use any criterion other than race,
it might be able to accomplish the same thing as it
did under the dual school system. The concern with
the result might also be based on the view that a
segregated student attendance pattern alone-with­
out regard to the basis for assignment-gives rise to
an inequality. The segregation might stigmatize the
blacks, deprive them of educationally significant
contacts with the socially and economically domi­
nant group, and reduce the share of resources allo­
cated to black schools simply because they are at­
tended only by members of the minority group.
But, of course, the picture is not all one-sided.
There are several countervailing factors that have
the effect of diluting this concern with the mere re­
sult-the segregated pattern of student attendance.
One is the uncertainty surrounding the central em­
pirical proposition that a segregated pattern of stu­
dent attendance itself leads to inferior education for
blacks. Another is the price of a remedial order
eliminating the segregated school pattern. Such an
order would probably divert financial resources be­
cause of the expense of transportation and frustrate
the intense associational desires of large parts of the
community. A court aware of these costs is likely
to feel a need to justify its action in terms that have
the quality of a moral imperative. A justification
couched in terms of the wrongness of excluding in­
dividuals from a school because of their race-the
classic concept of racial discrimination-certainly has
that flavor. But one cast primarily in terms of the
alleged inferiority of racially homogeneous schools
does not.
Owen M. Fiss
Brown v. Board of Education' stands for theproposition that the equal protection clause
prohibits the operation of a "dual school system"
and requires the conversion of that system into a
"unitary nonracial school system." Under a dual
system, students are assigned to schools on the basis
of their race in order to segregrate them. That is
clearly impermissible. But what is a permissible
basis for assigning students to schools under a "uni­
tary nonracial school system"? This seems to be the
central riddle of the law of school desegregation.
There is one easy answer to this question: Under
a "unitary nonracial school system" students may be
assigned to schools on the basis of any criterion
other than race. But there is an understandable re­
luctance to accept this answer. This stems from the
fact that even if some seemingly innocent criterion
is substituted for race as the basis for assignment,
virtually the same segregated patterns of student
attendance that existed under the dual system might
result-whites in one set of schools and blacks in
another. Moreover, there are reasons to be con­
cerned with this result, even assuming race is not
the basis for assignment. The concern might be
predicated on a fear of "evasion"-if the school
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
This article by Owen M. Fiss, Professor of Law at
The University of Chicago, is reprinted with the per­
mission of The University 'of Chicago Law Review
(Vol. 38, No.4, 1971).
12 These conflicting considerations account for the
uncertain nature of the law of school desegregation.
The controversy has in large part been over two ap­
proaches-one that forbids only the use of the racial
criterion as the basis of assignment (sometimes re­
ferred to as a de jure approach), and the other that
focuses on the result, the segregated patterns them­
selves (sometimes referred to as a de facto ap­
preach)." It is the latter approach which presents
the greatest challenge to the school segregation of
the North, for the assumption is that students in
the North are assigned to schools, not on the basis
of race, but instead on the basis of a seemingly in­
nocent criterion-geographic proximity. The contro­
versy between these two approaches is far from
resolved, but there has been a historical trend. I
would like to suggest that the trend of school de­
segregation doctrine has been one in which the
courts have rejected an approach that forbids only
the use of race and have moved in the direction of
the result-oriented approach.
I
The first significant development in SupremeCourt doctrine occurred in 1968 in Green v.
New Kent County School Board? There the crite­
rion for student assignment was individual choice.
Under the Board's plan, no student was assigned
to a school on the basis of his race. Instead, all
students, black and white, were assigned on the
basis of their own choice. The result was that some
blacks attended the formerly all-white school, most
blacks remained in the black school, and no whites
attended the black school. The Court declared that
in the school system before it, freedom-of-choice
was an impermissible basis for assigning students to
schools. The freedom-of-choice plan, the Court con­
cluded, had failed to "work." It had failed to pro­
duce a "unitary nonracial school system"-a system,
so the Court said, in which! there are not black
schools and white schools, but just schools.
Despite the captivating quality of these phrases,
they do not indicate the basis for invalidating the
choice plan. The Court said that it was not ruling
2 These issues are surveyed in more detail in an earlier ar­
ticle of mine, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: the
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965).
3391 U.S. 430 (1968).
freedom-of-choice plans unacceptable in all circum­
stances, but it failed to identify the particular cir­
cumstances that rendered the New Kent County
plan unacceptable. The Court carefully avoided
resting its decision on the view that the result was
the product of threats or that procedural irreg­
ularities of the plan interfered with the exercise of
choice. However, the Court did not say that a stu­
dent assignment plan would be. deemed to "work"
only when it produces an integrated pattern of stu­
dent attendance-when it eliminates, to the extent
possible, the all-black school. The message that
emerges from Green is a negative one-that a school
board does not fulfill its duty to convert to a unitary
system by substituting for a racial criterion one that
is innocent on its face. In effect, the Court rejected
the simple formula that reduced the equal protec­
tion clause to a prohibition against the use of race
as a basis of assignment and thereby permitted the
use of any other criterion. In 1968 this was a con­
siderable achievement.
Further movement in this direction occurred this
past term when in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education: the Supreme Court once again
considered the adequacy of student assignment
plans. The Court reaffirmed Green's rejection of the
view that only the use of race is forbidden but in
addition took four additional steps.
First, the seemingly innocent criterion held in­
adequate in Charlotte-Mecklenburg was not the
freedom-of-choice criterion of Green but one more
common in the North-assigning students to the
schools nearest their homes. This holding was not
premised on a finding that the proposed geographic
zones were "gerrymandered" in the Gomillion v.
Lightfoot5 sense. Instead, Charlotte-Mecklenburg
holds that even if geographic proximity, not race,
were the basis for the zones and thus for assign­
ments, the Board's duty to convert to a "unitary non­
racial school system" would not be satisfied.
Why is the use of this seemingly innocent cri­
terion-geographic proximity-impermissible? The
Court did not answer this question by merely point­
ing to the resulting segregated pattern of student
attendance. The existence of this segregation was
4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
5364 U.S. 339 (1960).
an important factor in its analysis, but the Court
added another ingredient. It sought to show that
the Board of Education was to some degree respon­
sible for the segregation, thereby making it "state­
imposed segregation." For this purpose, it focused
attention on the Board's past wrongdoing. The
Court saw a causal connection between the Board's
past discrimination and present segregation, and on
the basis of this connection attributed responsibility
to the Board for the segregation.
Two types of connections are suggested in the
opinion: (1) The past discriminatory conduct of a
school board might have contributed to the creation
and maintenance of segregated residential patterns
which, when coupled with the present use of geo­
graphic proximity as the basis for assignment, pro­
duce segregated schools. The assumption is that,
under the dual system, schools are racially desig­
nated as "white" or "black" and are located in dif­
ferent geographic areas, and that in the past racial
groups chose to live near "their" particular schools.
That choice might have been motivated by the de­
sire of families to live close to the schools which
their children attended, or it might have reflected
the belief that the racial designation of a school also
racially designated the residential area. (2) Prior
decisions by a school board regarding the location
and size of schools might in part explain why as­
signing students to the schools nearest their homes
will result in racially homogeneous schools. Under
the dual school system, school sites were selected
and the student-capacity of schools determined with
a view toward serving students of only one race.
These past policies are important because assign­
ment on the basis of geographic proximity will not
result in a racially homogeneous school unless, in
addition to the existence of residential segregation,
the school is so small that it serves only a racially
homogeneous area or so situated that it is the closest
school to students of only one race.
The second advance of Charlotte-Mecklenburg re­
lates to the fact that these causal connections be­
tween past discrimination and present segregation
are no more than theoretical possibilities and ob­
viously involve significant elements of conjecture.
The Court's response was to announce an eviden­
tiary presumption that in' effect resolves all the un­
certainties against the school board. The Court
quite consciously avoided holding that segregated
student attendance patterns are, in themselves, a
denial of equal protection, and instead emphasized
the role that past discriminatory conduct might have
played in causing those patterns. But the Court also
said that it was prepared to presume an impermis­
sible cause from the mere existence of segregation:
Where the school authority's proposed plan for
conversion from a dual to a unitary system con­
templates the continued existence of some
schools that are all or predominantly of one
race, they have the burden of showing that
such school assignments are genuinely nondis­
criminatory. The court should scrutinize such
schools, and the burden upon the school au­
thorities will be to satisfy the court that their
racial composition is not the result of present
or past discriminatory action on their part."
Concededly, the school board has the opportunity
to show that the consequence-segregated schools­
is not caused by its discriminatory action and that it
is therefore not responsible for the segregation. In
that sense the distinction between cause and conse­
quence is preserved. But the distinction is likely to
become blurred because the burden cast on the
board is a heavy one. The burden cannot be dis­
charged simply by showing that the school segre­
gation is produced, given the segregated residential
patterns, by assigning students on the basis of a
criterion other than race, such as geographic prox­
imity. The school board will also have to show that
its past discriminatory conduct-involving racial
designation of schools, site selection, and determina­
tion of school size-is not a link in the causal chain
producing the segregation. This will be very diffi­
cult to do, and the difficulty of overcoming a pre­
sumption will tend to accentuate the fact that gives
rise to it, namely, the segregated patterns, and this
will be reflected in the board's assignment policies.
Greater attention will be paid to the segregated pat­
terns.
The third development relates to what the Court
said must be done to eliminate these pattems­
everything possible. Prior to Charlotte-Mecklen­
burg it was generally assumed that even if attention
were focused on the result and a school board were
6402 U.S. at 26.
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14 obliged to eliminate the segregated pattern, the ex­
tent of the obligation would be simply «to take in­
tegration into consideration." Under this formula­
tion of the remedial obligation, integration would
be one value, along with others (such as minimizing
the time and expense of transportation and avoiding
safety hazards), that must be considered in design­
ing attendance plans. There would be a rough par­
ity among these values. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg
the Court constructed a hierarchy among these val­
ues in which integration assumes a role of paramount
importance. The Court declared that «the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation" must be
achieved. The practicalities of the situation must,
of course, also be taken into account, but the Court
made clear that if there is a conflict between inte­
gration and other values, integration will generally
prevail.
Thus, the remedial plan in Charlotte-Mecklen­
burg requires a massive, long-distance transporta­
tion program: Students living closest to inner-city
schools are to be assigned to suburban ones and
students living closest to suburban schools are to
be assigned to inner-city ones. True, this is the
plan that had been formulated by the district court,
and there is considerable language in the Supreme
Court's opinion about the broad discretion that the
district court has in fashioning a remedy. But the
discretion the Court vests in the district court goes
only to the question of how integration shall be
achieved-the details of the remedial plan (such as
which particular schools shall be paired for the
transportation program). The lower court has no
discretion to alter or disregard the central remedial
obligation-achieving the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation-and the plan it approves will
be measured by that stringent standard. That is why
in a companion case involving Mobile, Alabama, the
Supreme Court rejected a desegregation plan that
allowed some all-black schools to remain in opera­
tion.' The elimination of that residue of segregation
required assigning students across a major highway
that divided the metropolitan area. For the Fifth
Circuit, this factor constituted a sufficient practical
barrier to relieve the school board of its obligation
to remove all remnants of segregation from the sys-
7 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971):
tern." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded
because "inadequate consideration was given to the
possible use of bus transportation and split zoning."9
Fourth, Charlotte-Mecklenburg is significant be­
cause it validates the use of race in student assign­
ments when the goal is integration rather than seg­
regation. In this context there is little room for the
pretense of color blindness. In part this was antici­
pated in 1969 in United States v. Montgomery
County Board of Education;" a case 'involving fac­
ulty assignments. There the Court affirmed a de­
segregation order requiring that teachers be as­
signed so that the proportion of white and black
teachers in the system as a whole would be mirrored
in each school. The achievement of that goal, in the
face of pre-existing segregated patterns, required
that in the process of deciding where to assign
teachers some weight be given to each faculty mem­
ber's race. Similarly, in Charlotte-Mecklenburg the
Court recognized that the achievement of student
integration requires that race play some role in the
process of deciding to which school a student will
be assigned, and for that reason the Court permitted
the use of this criterion.
This aspect of Charlotte-Mecklenburg under­
mines the constitutional basis for one objection that
had frequently been voiced against remedial pro­
grams-whether court-ordered or voluntarily adopt­
ed-that were designed to eliminate segregation.
More broadly, it indicates a conceptual departure
from the approach to school desegregation that fo­
cuses exclusively on the racial criterion. In effect, it
says that the prohibition of the equal protection
clause against the use of race as a basis of assign­
ment cannot be understood independently of the
result. The prohibition against the use of race is
linked to the result. Race is a forbidden criterion for
assignment when it is used to produce segregation,
but not when it is used to produce integration.
II
These four doctrinal advances of Charlotte­Mecklenburg occurred in response to a situa­
tion, not readily found in the North, in which
a school board had maintained a "dual school sys-
SId. at 36.
9Id. at 38.
10395 U.S. 225 (1969).
tern" in the recent past. The opinion appears to be
further limited in its application by its emphasis on
recent, as opposed to ancient, history. It suggests
that the rules announced may be only transitional
requirements.11 Moreover, this concern with history
has an analytical basis. It is used to attribute re­
sponsibility. The Court's insistence that the school
board be responsible for the segregation is satisfied
in Charlotte-Mecklenburg by finding a pattern of
past discriminatory conduct. In time, however, the
legacy of past discrimination may become so at­
tenuated that it will be unrealistic to presume the
existence of any causal connection between it and
the present school segregation.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this
concern with recent past discrimination does not
confine Charlotte-Mecklenburg to the South. Until
a few years ago, Southern school districts openly
maintained dual school systems, and therefore the
existence of past discriminatory practices can be
established by admission. In Northern systems,
there is no such admission. But that, of course, does
not mean that the past discriminatory practices of
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg type did not occur. It
only means that they are more difficult, though not
impossible," to prove. In my judgment, a very close,
11 The passage, which was obviously tacked onto the end of
the opinion, indicating that it may have been exacted at the
last moment in exchange for someone's vote, reads:
At some point, these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. The systems will then be
"unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in Green
and Alexander.
It does not follow that the communities served by such
systems will remain demographically stable, for in a
growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school
authorities nor district courts are constitutionally re­
quired t-o make year-by-year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty
to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrim­
ination through official action is eliminated from the sys­
tem. This does not mean that federal courts are without
power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of
a showing that either the school authorities or some other
agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or
alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composi­
tion of the schools, further intervention by a district
court should not be necessary.
402 U.S. at 32.
12 See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. 151,286 F. Supp.
786 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (preliminary injunction), afJ'd, 404 F.2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1968), on remand, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (permanent injunction), afj'd with modification, 432
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970). Following the Charlotte-Mecklen­
burg decision, the Supreme Court denied the school board's
application for certiorari. 39' U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S., May 3,
1971).
hard look at the construction policies of Northern
school systems would reveal numerous instances in
which school boards in the recent past have chosen
sites and determined capacity with an eye toward
serving racially homogeneous areas-often called
"neighborhoods." Instead of formally and openly
designating a newly constructed school as the Negro
school, a school board may have called it the Lin­
coln School or the Booker T. Washington School
and staffed it only with black teachers.P The same
message is conveyed.
Thus, there are some situations where, because of
their recent past discrimination, Northern school
systems can be assimilated to the Southern systems,
and where the rules of Charlotte-Mecklenburg are
therefore clearly applicable. But beyond that, one
cannot simply say that Charlotte-Mecklenburg "out­
laws" the school segregation of the North. Because
of its focus on past discrimination, the case does not
lend itself to a blanket judgment about the North,
as it does with respect to the South. The net effect
of Charlotte-Mecklenburg is to move school de­
segregation doctrine further along the continuum:
toward a result-oriented approach, but the progres­
sion is not complete. Additional steps are required.
It seems to me, however, that over time this move
will probably be made and that, in retrospecLChar­
lotte-Mecklenburg will then be viewed, like Green,
as a way-station to the adoption of a general ap­
proach to school segregation which, by focusing on
the segregated patterns themselves, is more respon­
sive to the school segregation of the North.
This forecast is based in part on my view that the
Court will want to avoid the appearance of picking
on the South. This appearance is derived from the
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13 While Charlotte-Mecklenburg dealt primarily with stu­
dent assignment, in my judgment the most difficult aspect of
school desegregation, it also reaffirmed previous doctrine re­
quiring the desegregation plan to liquidate all aspects of the
dual .system, including faculty segregation. . This has con­
siderable significance for the North. The Court wrote:
In Green, we pointed out that existing policy and prac­
tice with regard to faculty, staff, transportation, extracur­
ricular activities, and facilities were among the most im­
portant indicia of a segregated system. 391 U.S., at 435.
Independent of student assignment, where it is possible
to identify a "white school" or a "Negro school" simply
by reference to the racial composition of teachers and
staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or
the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of
violation of substantive constitutional rights under the
Equal Protection Clause is shown.
402 U.S. at 18.
16 fact that segregated patterns of student attendance
are no less severe in Northern cities than in South­
ern ones. Under Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Southern
school systems are obliged to eliminate those pat­
terns and to achieve the greatest possible degree of
integration. But there is no similar blanket judg­
ment about those patterns in the North. A compli­
cated analysis of causation might, under the Char­
lotte-Mecklenburg theory, serve to justify the differ­
ential treatment afforded these otherwise identical
patterns. But such an analysis is not likely to be
understood or even believed by most people. And
no national institution can afford to be unresponsive
to the popular pressures likely to be engendered by
an appearance of differential treatment of certain re­
gions of the country. Even the Supreme Court is
not immune from such pressures, particularly when
they become identified with the ideal of equal treat­
ment.
The forecast is based also on my view that the
predominant concern of the Court in Charlotte­
Mecklenburg is in fact the segregated pattern of
student attendance, rather than the causal role
played by past discriminatory practices. I realize
that in Charlotte-Mecklenburg the Court used past
discrimination to attribute responsibility to the
board for the school segregation, but this theory for
attributing responsibility seems contrived. Although
the existence of past discrimination cannot be de­
nied, the Court made no serious attempt either to
determine or even to speculate on the degree to
which it contributes to present segregation. Nor
did the Court attempt to tailor the remedial order
to the correction of that portion of the segregation
that might reasonably be attributable to past dis­
crimination. The Court moved from (a) the undis­
puted existence of past discrimination to (b) the
possibility or likelihood that the past discrimination
played some causal role in producing segregated
patterns to (c) an order requiring the complete elim­
ination of those patterns. The existence of past dis­
crimination was thus used as a "trigger" and not for
a pistol, but for a cannon. Such a role cannot be de­
fended unless the primary concern of the Court is
the segregated patterns themselves, rather than the
causal relation of past discrimination to them. The
attention paid to past discrimination can be viewed
as an attempt by the Court to preserve the conti-
nuity with Brown and to add a moral quality to
its decision.
The Court is not likely to abandon its require­
ment that a school board be responsible for the seg­
regated patterns before it is ordered to eliminate
them. This requirement, however, need not fore­
close any doctrinal advance. An alternative theory
for attributing responsibility exists-one that is
equally applicable to North and South and well­
rooted in other areas of the law, such as torts. This
theory would hold the school board responsible for
the foreseeable and avoidable consequences of its
own action. In this context, the pertinent action of
the school board is its choice of a criterion for stu­
dent assignments. The board decides how students
are to be assigned. The result of using a criterion
such as geographic proximity in a system with resi­
dential segregation is foreseeable; and in most in­
stances there are reasonable measures that the board
could adopt, if not to eliminate, then at least to
mitigate the result that flows from the use of that
criterion.
This theory for attributing responsibilty is not
without limitations. For example, the causal chain
linking the school board's decision to assign on the
basis of geographic proximity and the school segre­
gation might be broken if it could be presumed that
present residential segregation is truly voluntary.
Moreover, the board might be relieved of respon­
sibility if there were no "reasonable" steps it could
take to avoid school segregation. For this reason,
this theory might be viewed as holding the school
board to a lesser standard than that of Charlotte­
Mecklenburg, which, through the triggering action
of past discrimination, requires the board to take
every possible step to eliminate segregation. How­
ever, this difference in standards roughly parallels
tort rules which hold a person responsible for all
the consequences of an intentional wrongdoing but
which limit liability to the proximate consequences
when the wrongdoing is not intentional. In this area
a rule that requires the school board to take reason­
able steps-as opposed to all possible steps-to elim­
inate segregation seems to be the more sensible one
and therefore the one that will predominate. It does
not rest on the unrealistic assumption that all pres­
ent segregation is a consequence of past wrong­
doing, and it gives a more balanced appraisal to
competing values that should be taken into consid­
eration in assigning students to schools. In any
event, the general effect of the theory would be to
focus attention on the segregated patterns them­
selves and to bridge the doctrinal gap between
Charlotte-Mecklenburg and an approach to school
desegregation that emphasizes primarily the result.
Admittedly, this theory for attributing responsi­
bility does not require the construction of a causal
chain that includes a racially discriminatory act in
the past. But, analytically, that should be unneces­
sary. The equal protection clause requires that some
government agency be responsible for the unequal
treatment, but it does not require that the responsi­
bility be predicated on a causal chain involving an
earlier discrimination. It does not require double
discrimination. There is no need to search for a
second discrimination if it is determined that the
segregated patterns themselves render the educa­
tion afforded blacks inferior and thus are a form of
unequal treatment. Under this approach the central
dispute would be over the factual assertion that seg­
regated education is inferior. Indeed, this is what
the dispute should be about.
The Court in Charlotte-Mecklenburg appears to
have avoided this dispute by relying on past dis­
crimination. Arguably, the denial of equal protec­
tion in Charlotte-Mecklenburg originated in past
discriminatory school construction practices and, al­
though the Court was no longer able to stop those
practices, the injunction it issued could be viewed
as an attempt to undo the effects of the past wrong.
Under this interpretation, the school segregation
was a present effect of the past denial of equal pro­
tection, and not itself a denial of equal protection.
But this interpretation of Charlotte-Mecklenburg
does not seem persuasive. It seems much more
plausible that the segregated patterns themselves,
and not the past construction practices, are viewed
as the denial of equal protection. To regard all
school segregation as simply an "effect" of the past
denial of equal protection requires the positing of
an unproved and unlikely causal connection be­
tween the two. Furthermore, there is no reason why
the courts should use their remedial powers to cor­
rect the effect of a past wrong unless that effect is
itself harmful or disadvantageous. Thus, at the very
least, there is an implicit judgment in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg that segregation itself is harmful or
disadvantageous. And if the segregation is viewed as
particularly harmful or disadvantageous to blacks,
then it can be construed as a form of unequal treat­
ment. Under this interpretation, the only question
remaining is whether the school board is responsible
for it. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg the Court attrib­
uted responsibility for segregation on the basis of
past discrimination. My point is that there is an
alternative theory for attributing responsibility for
the segregation that is as intellectually satisfying as
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg theory requiring a
search for past discrimination."
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III
Thus far the development in school desegregation
doctrine has been largely the work of the courts,
and my forecast about future direction is based on
the view that the courts will-in the face of popular
pressure and logic-evolve an approach to school
desegregation that is increasingly result-oriented.
Within the weeks immediately following Charlotte­
Mecklenburg that seems to be precisely what has
been happening in a few lower courts." It is im­
portant to emphasize, however, that other branches
of government need not wait for these projected
doctrinal advances.
,
14 It should also be pointed out that the very use of geo­
graphic criteria may be as responsible for residential segrega­
tion as past discriminatory construction policies. By rigidly
adhering to geographic criteria over a long period of time, a
school board assures the white parent who does not want his
children to go to school with blacks that this desire can be ful­
filled by moving into a white neighborhood. The use of geo­
graphic criteria also assures the white parent that if he moves
out of the neighborhood into which blacks are moving, he will
be leaving the blacks behind. They will not follow him to the
new school-unless they also change residence.
15 See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., No. 20477 (6th Cir., filed
May 28,1971); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
No. C-70 1331 SAW (N.D. Cal., filed April 28, 1971). But see
Spencer v. Kugler, Civil No. 1123-70 (D.N.J.,filed May 13,
1971) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state law that
made boundaries of school districts conform to municipal
boundaries).
continued on page 22
 
Some Thoughts on
Legal Education 19
Richard A. Posner
Q
What should the student come away with at
• the end of three years at the law school?
A What the student primarily, although by no• means exclusively, should bring away from
law school is a set of skills in finding out what the
law is. If you asked a layman what a lawyer's func­
tion was, he would probably seem both mystified
and skeptical. He probably assumes that when he
comes in with a problem the lawyer nods and looks
wise, and then as soon as the client has left, the
lawyer goes to a book and looks up the answer,
writes it down and charges him $500.
But if you think about it, it is really very difficult
to find out what a person's rights and liabilities are.
When a layman comes in and states a problem
there's first the question of characterization, relat­
ing the factual statement to some legal concept,
what in. the first year examinations is the problem
of identifying issues. It's fundamental, because
problems don't come labelled with legal tags. The
layman, the client, doesn't know what legal concept
he is invoking; this makes relating the factual state­
ment to a legal concept a difficult and challenging
task, something that requires drill and practice.
Once you have the relevant concept in mind, it is
still not at all obvious what the client's legal rights
are. Oliver Wendell Holmes said that what he
meant by law was a prediction of what the courts
would do. That's the operational definition from
the standpoint of the client. He wants to know what
This intervi�w with Richard A. Posner, Professor of
Law at The University of Chicago, is reprinted with
the permission of Free (Vol. 3, No.2, 1971). The
interview was conducted by Steven L. Fisher '74
and Steven L. Harris '74, co-editors of Free.
will happen to him and what he will get through
the legal process. For the lawyer to make a predic­
tion, he has to draw inferences from what the legis­
lature has said, what courts have said in the past,
and how courts have decided similar cases. Since
very often the question the lawyer is confronted
with has never arisen in precisely that same form
before, the lawyer has to guess how a court that has
decided a similar question would decide his.
These two skills-identifying legal questions and
then predicting how courts will react to a question
that hasn't come up a hundred times before-seem
to me of the essence of legal training; and they are
real skills, which laymen lack. Non-lawyers can
give advice on certain questions, as for example in­
come tax services do. But with any case that has
elements of novelty, the layman will not know how
to relate the facts to legal issues, will not know how
to make a prediction as to how the courts will react
and will not even know where to look for evidence
of courts' likely reactions in opinions, statutes, or
hearings. Acquisition of these skills is most clearly
related to the first-year courses because there the stu­
dents' unfamiliarity with skills is most pronounced
and the teachers' function in drilling them in the
skills most obvious.
Q. What classroom methods do you consider
most effective in teaching legal skills?
A. To attempt to communicate these skills in
lectures would be futile. The lectures would im­
part a body of concepts, of principles, but wouldn't
help the student, as a lawyer, in taking facts given
him by a client and finding the applicable legal
concept in the vast body of doctrines and rules that
he had learned; nor would they help the student
with predicting how courts would decide. Law
school classroom teaching, especially in the first
20 year, is a kind of drill in the sense that the teacher,
by his questions, tries to compel the student to learn
by doing. Some of the drill is designed to make
sure that students can read cases. Reading cases
isn't like reading novels. One of the basic elements
in predicting how courts will decide a new case is
to find the rule that is latent in the existing case. It
may not be well stated by the judge. It may not be
stated at all; there may just be facts and a result.
Law teaching involves a process of questioning the
students about their reading, putting to them new
factual variations on the case and asking the student
whether this changes the result.
This is imitative of what happens in the real world
too. A client comes in and states a problem. You
look up the relevant cases once you have identified
the issues, and find that they deal with different
factual situations, and the question you must de­
cide is how the court is going to react to the new
situation. When the teacher puts a question to you
as a variant of what happened in a case you have
read, it's to give you an opportunity to practice
figuring out what the reaction of the court will be
to a variant. The examination process, when it is
properly implemented, gives the student an arti­
ficial, but nonetheless useful and concentrated, op­
portunity to practice the essential legal skills.
Q. Students have stated that what you described
as "drill" is actually a form of intimidation, in which
professors are trying to put them through the equiv­
alent of a fraternity hell week. That is, students
have to go through the indoctrination period and
suffer like everyone else did before they can become
a member of the club. Do you think that there is
any truth in this, and if there is, what educational
purpose does it serve?
A. I think our faculty is basically a group of
pussycats as far as intimidation is concerned. A
Grant Gilmore, a Harry Kalven, a Phil Neal is not
out to intimidate. What is true is that the atmos­
phere of a class of 150 or 160, or now 180, is in­
herently intimidating. If a student makes a stupid
comment in a class like that, he may feel foolish or
embarrassed in a way that he wouldn't if he were
talking in a small group. There is really nothing,
it seems to me, that the teacher can do to eliminate
that problem, even if he doesn't comment upon an
answer.
Q. But how much is there of asking the unan­
swerable question, a stump-the-student type of
thing, which is what some regard as a futile intellec­
tual game that doesn't have beneficial or construc­
tive results?
A. There are some questions where the teacher
doesn't know the answer. I don't know why it's in­
appropriate for him to ask it of you. There are
other questions which are simply very difficult ques­
tions, and what the teacher is trying to do is stretch
the analytical power of the students. After all, the
teacher is aiming the question not at the one person
whom he calls on but the whole class. If he asks a
person a very difficult question and does it in a way
that does not imply that failure to answer will mark
the student as a cretin, I don't know why it should
be a source of unhappiness.
I know that some students last year said that
they sensed a trace of hostility on the part of the
teachers. I don't think it's true. It may be that
teachers expect more of students than it is reason­
able to expect and are disappointed. Perhaps they
have standards of preparation that are excessive.
But the notion that there's a deliberate or implicit
policy of intimidating students and showing who
is boss is not true.
One thing I have noticed, though, is a good deal
of gratuitous cruelty on the part of students. Last
year's first-year class victimized several students;
they just wouldn't let them alone. It got to the
point that whenever Mr. X or Miss or Mrs. Y would
open his or her mouth there would be boos and cat­
calls. Also, what's very funny to me standing in
front of the room is watching the faces that a stu­
dent who is reciting doesn't see. While he or she is
talking innocently you occasionally see amazing
facial contortions. Every once in a while whenever
you're dealing with a group of people over one
hundred you have the sense of an unpredictable
mob. Will they rush up and tear one of the stu­
dents limb from limb? At those moments when the
students are booing or hissing or laughing derisively,
you wonder if you're in control. I don't suggest
this is common, but it is there; I suppose it is a
product of the tension among the students. Another
thing is that law as a profession seems to draw peo­
ple who are very aggressive and competitive and
really want to prove themselves.
These seem to be endemic attributes of legal edu­
cation. When I was a student at Harvard Law
School, Harvard had the reputation of being un­
bearable, and the students were supposed to be a
really unattractive group; you went there to see
whether you could endure. You heard a lot of talk
about people committing suicide or stealing each
other's notes. But when I was a student it just
didn't occur to people to vocalize their unhappy
feelings. That is changed and that's why you get
the impression there is greater disaffection now. I
think it was always there.
Q. Isn't that a pretty terrible way to spend a year?
A. The first year at Harvard was a grim year. I
thought it was on balance a very good experience.
It was tough but a very good drill. The question is
whether something like that inflicts psychological
damage on the people that don't do well that is
greater than the corresponding gain. I don't know.
Q. Do you think there is anything that can be
done to alleviate this tension and hostility?
A. I'm not sure there are any structural changes
that would have much impact on morale. The prob­
lem goes deeper than grading, certainly. Part of
the problem is that students tend to have had very
successful college careers and then they come into
a law school environment in which they're put into
the position of starting over from scratch, learning
a new technical skill. They find that their success
in college doesn't necessarily presage success in law
school. They find that legal ability is not the same
thing as general intelligence. It is distributed un­
evenly and some think inequitably. There will al­
ways be people in the first-year class who do very
well without doing very much work, or successfully
concealing the work they do, while a lot of other
students will be very industrious and not do well
and not understand why. If this were a music school
they would accept the fact that talent in a particular
field is a very peculiarly distributed thing.
Reading the exams in the torts course last year I
was surprised at the dispersion of the exam per­
formances. I guess it's not fair to compare the best
paper in the class with the worst paper in the class,
but even if you compare the tenth paper from the
bottom with the tenth from the top, the dispersion
is very large, and that bothers me. Even though
everybody who is admitted has pretty good ere-
dentials and capacity, when it comes to writing
exams, the students indicate quite different abilities
to master the skills that are taught in the course.
This may be something that evens out after three
years; maybe when you test people after two quar­
ters you give an unfair advantage to people who
have gotten the trick of it sooner.
Q. If you were law school czar, what changes
would you make in the law school curriculum?
A. I think the first-year curriculum and methods
are satisfactory in the sense that no one has sug­
gested an attractive alternative. But what I would
like to see is a second- and third-year curriculum
that is revised in two directions. One direction
would be to give students courses that would be a
lot closer to the problems of practice, and yet treat
the problems with a depth that the student wouldn't
get if he were just farmed out to a law office. An
example of such a course is the business planning
course that Mr. Kitch gave last year with two law­
yers from the Kirkland & Ellis firm. They dealt with
the kind of problem you often get in a law office, a
problem that does not Ht nice subject matter cate­
gories and therefore would not arise in a typical law
school course. Mr. Fiss did the same thing in his
land development course. Both of these courses
seem to me promising developments in making law
school more practical, realistic and concrete. We
have also attempted in the Bigelow program in re­
cent years to give problems that will provide a
realistic counterpoint to the rather abstract class­
room experience, and thus give the students a better
feel for what the problems of law practice are like.
I would also like to see more courses that provide
a different type of intellectual rigor from what you
get by reading cases: courses that bring in the social
sciences more systematically, that give the students
more perspective on the legal system, that acquaint
them with the impressive intellectual traditions of
the law such as the history of legal thought. It might
helpIf in areas where there is a strong faculty in­
terest, such as legal history and government regula­
tion of business, to encourage students to do more
substantial independent research, and for more
credit, than is customary at present.
Q. Is there, and should there be, any room in the
law school for people who are not planning to prac­
tice law?
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II 22 A. Yes, there should be, and it's one reason why a
somewhat different type of course should be avail­
able. There are new careers opening up in law-re­
lated areas. For instance, judicial administration is
a burgeoning area because courts are administered
in a very archaic way. Perhaps as a result of -the
growing academic reputation of the Law School, we
are beginning to get students whose interests in the
law are more intellectual than practical; as we get
more of these people we should offer a more diversi­
fied program.
II'
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The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case
continued
Local agencies are today free to institute the ap­
propriate measures to correct segregated patterns
of student attendance. There is no suggestion in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg that such voluntary reme­
dial measures need be predicated on the discovery
of past discrimination. Indeed, this term the Su­
preme Court invalidated two statewide "anti-bus­
ing" laws, one in New York" and the other in North
Carolina," that would have impeded the efforts of
local school boards to correct racial imbalance.
Moreover, Congress need not wait until the Supreme
Court declares a practice a violation of the equal
protection clause before requiring (or inducing)
local authorities to correct it. Cases such as Katzen­
bach v. Morgan18 and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer CO.19
indicate the lengths to which the Court will go
to indulge and even to encourage congressional ac­
tivity on behalf of the cause of racial equality. Un­
der the Civil War amendments, Congress is free to
enact a rule of law that would require (or induce)
school boards throughout the country to take rea­
sonable steps to eliminate segregated patterns of
student attendance-without regard to proof in each
instance of past discriminatory practices and their
contemporary vestiges. Such legislation can be
predicated on a judgment about the inequality that
arises from a segregated pattern of student attend-
ance itself. And if the legislature insists, as does
the Court in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, that the segre­
gation be "state-imposed," then such legislation can
be predicated on a conclusion that the South has no
monopoly on past discrimination, or that school
boards are responsible for the foreseeable and avoid­
able consequences of their own actions. In any
event, there is no question about the authority to
enact nationwide school desegregation laws. For
the last several years that has been clear. The only
question is about the will. Conceivably, Charlotte­
Mecklenburg, by imposing such a heavy burden on
the South and by requiring the greatest possible de­
gree of actual desegregation, might be sufficient in­
ducement for such legislation. That might be the
most significant aspect of Charlotte-Mecklenburg
for the North and for the law of school deseg­
regation.
16 Chropowicki v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (summary
affirmance of three-judge district court ruling).
17 North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971).
18384 U.S. 641 (1966).
19392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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Kenneth W. Dam
DAM ApPOINTED TO
GOVERNMENT POSITION
Kenneth W. Dam, Professor of Law,
is on leave this year as an Assistant
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget in the Executive Office
of the President. In that capacity he
is responsible for the work of the
National Security and the Inter­
national Programs Divisions of OMB.
The National Security Programs Di­
vision is the principal liaison at the
staff level of OMB with all echelons
of the Department of Defense and
defense agencies. In this capacity
the Division is responsible for the de­
velopment and review of long-range
programs for defense, the projection
of fiscal estimates based on these
programs, and staff work relating to
preparation of the Annual Defense
budget. The International Programs
Division is responsible for review
and examination of programs, budget
requests, operating methods, man­
agement, and legislative proposals of
the Department of State, Agency for
From The
Law School
International Development, United
States Information Agency, and other
agencies having responsibility in the
area of international affairs.
Mr. Dam participates on behalf
of OMB in the work of the National
Security Council, the Council on In­
ternational Economic Policy, and the
Volcker Group on international
monetary policy.
Mr. Dam was recently the guest
n�: honor at a reception sponsored by
the Washington law alumni.
CURRIE AND THE ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
In a feature article in the Chicago
Tribune, September 5, 1971 the first
year's program of the Illinois Pol­
lution Control Board was discussed.
David P. Currie, Professor of Law,
is currently on leave as Chairman of
the Board. "The Illinois Pollution
Control Board has compiled a record
of bold and aggressive action in its
first full year of operation, earning
a reputation as one of the leading
state environmental control agencies
in the nation. Though its decisions
have not always been popular, the
five-man board has reaped lavish
praise from the public and public
officials for its tough-minded attitude
toward pollution control and its
scrupulous detachment from political
entanglements."
In responding to the analysis of
his program to date, Mr. Currie
noted that "full-fledged enforcement
cannot be undertaken until there are
adequate rules to enforce .... I
wish we had more enforcement
cases, including some cases in the
city of Chicago."
CONTINENTAL LECTURES AND
ACTIVITIES OF CASPER
Gerhard Casper, Professor of Law
and Political Science and Chairman
of the Committee on Graduate
Studies, has returned to the School
following a year's leave during which
he was Visiting Professor in the fall
of 1970 at the Catholic University
of Louvain in Belgium where he
taught a course in American Consti­
tutional Law. From January through
the summer of 1971, Mr. Casper was
a Social Science Research Fellow at
the Federal Constitutional Court in
West Germany during which he
gathered data for a project consisting
of a study of the German political
system from the vantage point of the
Constitutional Court. The study will
make use of comparison in order to
outline the profile by contrasting the
system with that of the United States.
David P. Currie
Court decisions are employed as
starting points for an analysis of the
Court's attempt to clarify constitu­
tional and political commitments of
the post-war German polity.
During his stay in Karlsruhe, Mr.
Casper was invited to give a lecture
at the Court on "Freedom of Speech
and the Law of Defamation" which
compared the legal and political
foundations of the American and
German jurisprudence on the subject.
The lecture has subsequently been
published as Redefreiheit und
Ehrenschutz (Karlsruhe: C. F.
Muller, 1971). Mr. Casper also pre­
pared a presentation for a one hour
radio broadcast on the largest West
German broadcasting system (WDR
in Cologne) on freedom of speech in
the West German army.
This fall Mr. Casper and Professor
Hans Zeisel have completed
collaboration on an empirical
study of lay judges in the German
criminal courts which was re-
ported in the first issue of the Journal
of Legal Studies, edited by
Richard A. Posner, Professor of Law
in the Law School. Mr. Zeisel and
Mr. Casper plan to edit in German
a volume comprising their research
on the German mixed tribunals, an
Austrian study, and a Polish study.
A COMMUNICATION FROM
MALCOLM P. SHARP
In resp<;mse to a query from the
editor, Malcolm P. Sharp, Professor
Emeritus of Law, wrote from Al­
buquerque, New Mexico where he
is on the faculty of the School of
Law at The University of New Mex­
ico. He is teaching a seminar on
Private Law Reform which deals
with problems of law revision, par­
ticularly private law revision. It will
consider the advisability and feasi­
bility of private law revision by act
of Congress, and the constitutional
authority for such legislation devel­
oped in the constitutional doctrine of
William Crosskey.
In addition to referring to an essay
which he is preparing on a variation
on the theme of human propensities
and international order, the subject
of a number of earlier essays,
Mr. Sharp writes:
"I retired a little over a year ago.
1 have still an office and facilities at
the Law School, with the result that
I have kept up an association with
students and colleagues. Last year
I was asked to talk on a number of
occasions, and this year I am giving
a seminar, which might recall old
times to some of my former students
at Chicago.
Gerhard Casper
In addition, one of last year's grad­
uates asked me to serve as consultant
to her in her first year (1970-71) of
practice. She is the wife of a suc­
cessful physician here and started her
own practice for reasons which in­
clude a sense of enterprise inde­
pendent of gain. She has had relevant
experience as a social worker, a legal
secretary and a medical student, as
well as some business experience.
She turns out to have been unusually
well equipped to hang out her shingle
in an old part of town and accumu­
late an extraordinarily varied and
self-supporting practice in her first
year.
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She persuaded me to apply for ad­
mission to the bar on motion, and I
was duly admitted last month. Up
to then 1 had been observing the
rules applicable to clerks, which
among other things relieved me of
any pressure to do a lot of things I
didn't want to do. I think, now that
she has developed great competence
in day-to-day work, that I shall limit
myself more than 1 have done to con­
sultation on particularly interesting
problems. The experience has been
and continues to be a remarkable step
ahead in my legal education.
Among other things I am using
problems suggested by one of Mrs.
Lyons' cases as a focal point for my
seminar. 1 am having a paper from
one of the students on the problems
of keeping a commercial code ade­
quately revised in the light of ex­
perience. Our case itself is in my
judgment not too complicated, but
it suggests an extraordinary range of
problems about the Code's Statute of
Frauds applicable to contracts of
sale. The case itself has some interest
on a variety of grounds involving the
law of contracts, and if it is not
settled, it may be tried in a few
months.
Reflections on the case have con­
firmed my impression that we waste
a considerable amount of time, which
if one adds up the hours over thirty
years of teaching becomes startling,
on teaching systematic but inade­
quate justifications for welching, in­
cluding the law of consideration and
the Statute of Frauds. On the other
hand, we deal unsystematically and
inadequately with the psychological
26 problems involved in legitimate ex­
cuses for not doing what the words of
an undertaking by themselves may
lead a hearer or reader to expect.
Besides this set of observations
which my colleagues and perhaps my
former students will recognize, my
seminar gives me an opportunity to
introduce the students here more
adequately than I have done, to my
continued and growing admiration for
William Crosskey's work. History
has been kind to the seminar by
giving us the Perez case and the wage
and price freeze as a focus supple­
menting Politics and the Consti­
tution."
Orientation picnic, Fall 1971
RHEINSTEIN ACTIVITIES
Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Professor
Emeritus of Comparative Law, is
Chief Editor of volume four on
Family Law in the International En­
cyclopedia of Comparative Law. Mr.
Rhe.nstein is currently a member of
the UNESCO Committee on Trends
in Contemporary Service. Among his
recent writings are "Das Erbrecht
von Familienangehorigen-Vereinigte
Staaten v. Amerika," Arbeiten zur
Rechtsvergleichung (1971), p. 9;
"Trends in Legal Science-United
States of America," 22 International
Social Science Journal, p. 443; "Les
Tendences de la Science Juridique,"
22 Revue Internationale des Sciences
Socia!es, les 484; new articles on
"Civil Law," "Divorce," "Conflict of
Laws," and "Inheritance," in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica; and
"Royal Bavaria" in volume 15 of
Modern Age. Mr. Rheinstein's book,
Marriage Stability, Divorce and the
Law has just been published by The
University of Chicago Press.
A NEW DEAN OF STUDENTS
Richard I. Badger '68 has been ap­
pointed Dean of Students in the
Law School. Mr. Badger replaces
Nicholas I. Bosen '66, who resigned
to be campaign manager for the
Democratic candidate for Lieutenant
Governor of Illinois, Neil Hartigan.
Mr. Badger will continue to have
responsibility for the direction of the
Placement Office.
THE CENTER FOR STUDIES
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice is intended to contribute to
the understanding, prevention, con­
trol, and more effective treatment of
crime and delinquency. The effec­
tiveness of the Center in stimulating
interest in research on problems in
the criminal process is illustrated by
the notes which follow, briefly de­
scribing a number of current and
recent projects. Although there are
a total of 26 research projects cur­
rently being conducted by the
Center, several of them may at this
time be of particular interest to
the public.
The object of the Illinois Jail
Survey, an empirical on-site survey
of 160 county and city Illinois jails,
was to supply information so that
state authorities could formulate
minimum standards and reorganize
the Illinois jail system. A report of
this project, directed by Hans W.
Mattick, Co-Director of the Center,
has resulted in ongoing reform proc­
esses.
Research from Soundings in De­
terrence, a project directed by
Franklin E. Zimring, Associate Pro­
fessor of Law, has produced the
following studies: "Perspectives on
Deterrence," "Deterrence: The Le­
gal Threat in Crime Control," and
"Studies in Deterrence."
Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger Pro­
fessor of Law and Criminology, who
served on a legislative commission
charged with redrafting the law on
competency to plead, and Robert A.
Burt conducted a series of studies
under the project heading Compe­
tency to Plead.
Related to an earlier study of the
role of juries in criminal trials, the
project entitled The Role of Lay
Judges in German Criminal Courts,
conducted by Professor Hans Zeisel
and Gerhard Casper, Professor of
Law and Political Science, studied
the role of lay judges in determining
guilt and fixing sentences in German
courts. The results of the project
were published in the first issue of
The lournal of Legal Studies, which
is edited by Richard A. Posner,
Professor of Law.
As a product of the project, Ap­
pointed Counsel's Guide, directed by
Marshall Patner '56, an expanded
and updated version of the 1968
"Appointed Counsel's Guide for Il­
linois Criminal Appeals" has been
published.
The Impact of Revenue-Sharing
Programs on Local Criminal Justice
Agencies is a project which utilizes
a variety of socio-economic and sur­
vey data to find out which factors in
various jurisdictions correlate with
the differential distribution of federal
funds under the Omnibus Crime
Control Act. The effects of state
planning efforts and grant allocation
procedures will be studied, in order
to determine the effectiveness of the
block-grant as a means of distributing
revenue and fostering innovative
programs in local criminal justice
agencies. Michael E. Milakovich,
Research Associate at the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice, is the
director of this project.
Co-directors of the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice are
Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger Pro­
fessor of Law and Criminology, and
Hans W. Mattick, Professional Lec­
turer in the Social Sciences Colle­
giate Division. Franklin E. Zimring,
Associate Professor of Law, is
Associate Director.
YOUR CHANCES OF BEING SLAIN
A black manin Chicago is ten times
as likely to be murdered as a white
man-and a black woman is twice as
likely to be murdered as a white man.
The murder of white women in
Chicago is so uncommon that, sta­
tistically, it is virtually insignificant.
These are several of the findings
of a study prepared by Franklin E.
Zimring, Associate Professor of Law
and Associate Director of the Center
for Studies in Criminal Justice, and
Richard Block, Assistant Professor of
Sociology at Loyola University.
Among other findings, the study
reveals the following:
- the murder rate more than
doubled from 1965 to 1970, but the
murder pattern changed very little.
- the most likely victim in 1970,
as in the five previous years, was a
young black man killed with a gun
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fired by another young black man.
- the victim and the killer prob­
ably knew each other. About three
of every five murders involve ac­
quaintances or relatives.
- typically the motive was some
kind of dispute, not robbery.
- the typical killer and his victim
are getting younger.
- the use of guns as the murder
weapon increased significantly.
The report was presented at a
meeting of the American Sociolog­
ical Association in Denver and was
prepared with the help of the
Chicago Police Department.
ZEISEL STUDY CRITICIZES
F.B.I. CRIME STATISTICS
A study authored by Hans Zeisel,
Professor of Law and Sociology, re­
cently submitted to President Nixon
by the Commission on Federal Sta­
tistics, urged that responsibility for
gathering and issuing data on crime
be transferred from the F.B.I. to an
independent agency. Mr. Zeisel con­
cluded that "the temptation to use
the statistics they collect for purposes
of arguing the law enforcement posi­
tions they hold has proved too strong
for the F.B.I." Mr. Zeisel cited past
criticisms of the F.B.I. crime bulle­
tins on technical grounds and said
that "the criticized procedures have a
common denominator. They tend to
increase the reported volume of
crime and the F.B.I., for reasons they
know best, seems to believe that the
nation is best served by this em­
phasis." Although the Zeisel study
said that the bureau may have a
duty to "fight for its convictions," it
added that "such partisan spirit is
not compatible with the impartiality
and objectivity required by an
agericy responsible for a most crucial
part of our statistical system, in­
volving the measurement of our na­
tional health."
ON THE CONDUCT OF
PRIVATE POLICE
Private police seem to enjoy exten­
sive powers, as dramatized in fiction,
movies, and television, but their real
life activities and limitations have
been largely ignored by legal com­
mentators. The rapid growth of the
private police industry and its move
into areas normally associated with
public law enforcement raise im­
portant questions about the conduct
and control of private police.
In an article entitled "Private
Police Forces: Legal Powers and
Limitations" in the Spring 1971
issue of The University of Chicago
Law Review Michael A. Braun and
David J. Lee explore the extent of
private police powers to arrest,
28 search, and interrogate. Although
the powers granted to private police
vary from state to state, "the ma­
jority of private police seem to pos­
sess no powers beyond those of the
ordinary citizen."
Finding the search and inter­
rogation powers of private police
ambiguous, the authors suggest legis­
lative clarification in both areas.
They conclude that although par­
allels between private and public
police exist, their motivations and
incentives differ, and blanket appli­
cations of public police sanctions to
private police appears unwarranted.
TRAFFIC COURT POLICY
AND DRUNK-DRIVERS
Publicity about a traffic court policy
of jailing drunk-drivers probably
reduced the number of night-time
traffic accidents in Chicago, ac­
cording to a study conducted by
Franklin E. Zimring, Associate
Professor and Associate Director of
the Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice. The study, supported by
the Council on Law-Related Studies
in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
compared Chicago's traffic accident
record after the announcement with
statistics covering the same period
the year before.
"Fatalities decreased from 88
during the same three-and-one-half
months of 1970 to 57 in 1971 after
Judge Raymond K. Berg's announce­
ment," Mr. Zimring said, "but this
decrease was probably due to factors
other than less drunk-driving." He
based this conclusion on two ob­
servations:
- the number of fatal accidents in
which blood tests show the deceased
had been drinking did not change
when compared to the same period
a year before.
- night-time fatalities, which are
more closely related to drunk-driving,
did not decrease any faster than day­
time fatalities, when compared to
the same period the year before.
USE OF FEDERAL COURT RECORDS
"Research Use of Federal Court
Records: What, Where, and How,"
was the topic of the Ninth Archival
Symposium held November 15th in
the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom.
Sponsored by the Law School and
the Federal Record Center (General
Services Administration), the Sym­
posium included among others a
presentation on "A Jurist's View of
Legal History," by The Honorable
William Campbell, Senior Judge,
Northern District, Illinois U. S.
Court, and a comment on the pro­
gram and future of legal history by
Stanley N. Katz, Professor of Legal
History in the Law School.
LAW WOMEN'S CAUCUS
With the influx of nearly thirty
women in the Class of 1974, the Law
Women's Caucus has grown substan­
tially this year. In October the Cau­
cus sponsored a panel discussion
with three alumnae, Linda Hirshman
'69, Judith Lonnquist '65, and
Marilyn Ireland '69, centering on
strategies for finding jobs, special
problems for women in everyday
performance as lawyers, and modes
of using legal expertise to work for
women's rights.
Throughout the academic year the
Caucus' major project will be the
development of a recruitment pro­
gram aimed at interesting high school
as well as college women in the legal
profession.
NEW FELLOWS FOR THE
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDY
Soia MentschikoH, Professor of Law,
and Harold Demsetz, Professor of
Economics, have been named
Fellows of the Center for Policy
Study, a University organization
founded in February, 1968 and
devoted to intensive, broad-based
examinations of major and interna­
tional policy issues. The Center
which has sponsored conferences on
the Middle East, China, Urban
Problems, and Science Priorities,
brings statesmen, scientists, business
and labor leaders, scholars, and
journalists to the campus to discuss
issues with faculty and students.
Presently the Center is sponsoring
a three-year Arms Control and For­
eign Policy Seminar, and a con­
tinuing Urban Journalism Fellowship
Program. Walter J. Blum, Professor
of Law, is a member of the Executive
Council and Philip B. Kurland, Pro­
fessor of Law, is currently a Faculty
Fellow.
ROUND TABLE MEETINGS,
FACULTY, AND A.A.L.S.
Participants in Round Table Meet­
ings at the Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools
held in Chicago December 27-29th
included Edmund W. Kitch, "Cur­
riculum Study Project," Harry Kal­
ven, Jr., "Torts," and Richard A.
Posner, "Wage and Price Controls."
Dean Phil C. Neal served as mod­
erator of the session on "Wage and
Price Controls" and Sheldon Tefft,
.Tames Parker Hall Professor Emer­
itus of Law, returned to Chicago
from the Bay Area to serve as
moderator of a session on "Equity."
SOME NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
RESEARCH RESOURCES
The Institute of Government Re­
search of the University of Arizona
has included in its International
Studies series a monograph by
Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign Law Li­
brarian and Lecturer in Legal Bibli­
ography, called Treaty Sources in
Legal and Political Research-Tools,
Techniques, and Problems: The
Conventional and the New (Tuscon:
The University of Arizona Press,
1971). The study deals with access
to information on recent treaties.
In September, 1971, the third
volume of abbreviations, compiled
by Mr. Sprudzs, the Benelux Ab­
breviations and Symbols: Law and
Related Subjects, was published by
Oceana Press in Dobbs Ferry, New
York. The series covers contem­
porary abbreviations and symbols
now used in the legal writings of
France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether­
lands, and Luxembourg.
THE FIRST ISSUE OF
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
Volume One, Number One of the
Law School's newest journal, The
Journal of Legal Studies, has just
appeared. Articles published in this
fourth scholarly journal of the
Law School include: "The Law and
Economics of Public Policy: A Plea
to the Scholars" by George J. Stigler;
"When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter?" by Harold Demsetz; "A
Theory of Negligence" by Richard
A. Posner; "The Medium Is the
Message: Firearm Caliber as a
Determinant of Death from Assault"
by Franklin E. Zimring; "Toward a
Theory of Stare Decisis" by Martin
Shapiro; "Lay Judges in the German
Criminal Courts" by Gerhard
Casper and Hans Zeisel; and "Urban
Politics and Judicial Behavior" by
Martin A. Levin.
The editor of the Journal is
Richard A. Posner, Professor of Law.
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To: Law Alumni
RE: LAW ALUMI NOTES
The many contributions of the
alumni to the first issue of Law
Alumni Notes makes us hope for
continued interest in and support
of this new publication. We antici­
pate that the second issue will be
published in April and urge you to
submit notes concerning other alum­
ni as well as yourself. Send the notes
to -
The Editor
Law Alumni Notes
The University of Chicago
Law School
nn E. 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
_ ____j
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Brief Notes from
the Law School
Kenneth Culp Davis, John P. Wilson
Professor of Law, was awarded an
LL.D. from Whitman College,
June, 1971. Mr. Davis has just con­
cluded his third edition of Admin­
istrative Law - Cases - Text -
Problems (West Publishing Co.).
In his Preface, Mr. Davis notes that
"the treatment of discretionary
justice is probably only a bare be­
ginning of what is needed. Future
creative scholars may discern a mes­
sage for them in this book: extraor­
dinary opportunities for pioneering
scholarship exist in the seemingly
impenetrable jungle of informal and
unreviewed discretionary action.
That is where the injustice is clus-
.
teredo That is where resourcefulness
will be especially needed in coming
decades. That is where the main
part of the future lies for adminis­
trative law research."
Harold Demsetz, Professor of
Economics, was on the faculty
this summer for the Summer Eco­
nomics Institute at the University of
Rochester.
Allison Dunham, Arnold Shure
Professor of Urban Law and Direc­
tor of the Center for Urban Studies,
was elected spokesman of the Coun­
cil of the University Senate, the
executive body of the faculty.
Julius G. Getman, Professor of
Law at Indiana University, is a
Visiting Professor in the Law School
during the Winter and Spring Quar­
ters. Mr. Getman received his LL.B.
and LL.M. from Harvard Law School
and has served as an attorney with
Kenneth Culp Davis
the National Labor Relations Board.
He has been on the faculty at In­
diana University since 1963 where
he specializes in labor law. He is
presently conducting a major em­
pirical study on union representation
elections funded by the National
Science Foundation. He is teaching
a course in Law, Social Change, and
the Status of Women during the
Winter Quarter and Labor Law this
Spring.
Stanley N. Katz, Professor of Legal
History, was a Visiting Fellow this
fall at the Newberry Library. This
year's Newberry Seminar was on
Transfer of Culture from England to
America in the 18th Century.
Wayne A. Kerstetter, who has
served as Research Associate and
Administrator of the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice, is now a
Special Assistant to the New York
City Police Commissioner. His work
will focus on ways of controlling
corruption among police. Mr.
Kerstetter is one of six civilians
brought in under a grant from the
Police Foundation.
Julius G. Getman
Edmund W. Kitch, Professor of
Law, has been appointed to serve
on the Advisory Council of the
Illinois Institute for Continuing
Legal Education.
Philip B. Kurland, Professor of
Law, has been appointed Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise Lecturer for
1972. The lecture, "The Appoint­
ment and Disappointment of
Supreme Court Justices," is to be
given at Arizona State College
in March. John N. Langbein
John H. Langbein joined the Law
School faculty over the summer, as­
suming an appointment of Assistant
Professor of Law. He spent the first
half of the last year in Italy and
.
England, completing work on a
thesis in comparative legal history for
which he received the Ph.D. degree
from Cambridge University this past
summer. Mr. Langbein will teach
courses in the Law School this year
in wills and future interests, estates
and trusts, and in legal history.
Leon M. Liddell, Professor of Law
and Law Librarian, has been elected
First Vice-President of the Interna­
tional Association of Law Libraries.
Bernard D. Meltzer, James Parker
Hall Professor of Law, presented a
paper on "Labor Arbitration and
Overlapping and Conflicting Reme­
dies for Employment Discrimination"
October 15th in Buffalo at a session
sponsored jointly by the American
Arbitration Association and the Fed­
eral Mediation Conciliation Service.
The presentation will be published
in The University of Chicago Law
Review. Mr. Meltzer has also re­
cently prepared an article on "Priv­
ileges Against Self Incrimination and
the Hit and Run Opinions" which
appears in The Supreme Court
Review, 1971.
Soia Mentschikoff, Professor of
Law, was Frankel Lecturer at the
University of Houston this past
summer.
Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger Pro­
fessor of Law and Criminology and
Director of the Center for Studies
in Criminal Justice, has been elected
to the board of trustees of the Na­
tional Council on Crime and Delin­
quency. The Council, headquartered
in Paramus, New Jersey, was estab­
lished in 1970 to help improve the
criminal justice system through re­
search, surveys, standard-setting,
and citizen action.
Roscoe T. Steffen and Richard
S. E. Johns are co-authors of the
article, "The After-Acquired Surety:
Commercial Paper," 59 California
Law Review 1459 (1971).
Mr. Steffen is John P. Wilson Pro­
fessor of Law Emeritus and Mr.
Johns is currently a Bigelow Teach­
ing Fellow at the Law School.
Two members of the Class of 1971
will be clerking for Justices of the
United States Supreme Court be­
ginning the Court's 1972 fall term.
Robert Barnett will be clerking for
Justice Byron R. White. Currently
Mr. Barnett is clerking for Judge
Minor Wisdom, U. S. Court of Ap­
peals, Fifth Circuit, New Orleans.
Geoffrey Stone will be clerking for
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Mr. Stone is currently clerking for
Judge J. Skelly Wright, U. S. Court
of Appeals, D. C. Circuit.
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Hans Zeisel, Professor of Law and
Sociology, participated in a discus­
sion of "The American Jury - Its
Past, Present and Future" on The
Judicial Administration Section's
program at the 25th American Trial
Lawyers Association in August. He
was also one of the two speakers on
the Columbus Town Meeting on the
air, debating "Is Stronger Law En­
forcement Needed to Curb the Tide
of Violence?"
Recent articles by Mr. Zeisel in­
clude "Crime and Law-and-Order,"
The American Scholar (Autumn,
1971); "Courts for Methuselah,"
University of Florida Law Review,
XXIII, No.2, 1971; and
"
... And
Then There Were None: The Dimi­
nution of the Federal Jury," The
University of Chicago Law Review
(Summer, 1971).
Bernard D. Meltzer and Joel H. Kaplan '69 exchange opinions at the
traditional Entering Students Dinner in honor of the Class of 1974.
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